

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DARRYL McGORE,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:10-cv-682

v.

Honorable Robert J. Jonker

UNKNOWN SERVINSKI et al.,

Defendants.

**OPINION DENYING LEAVE
TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS - THREE STRIKES**

Plaintiff Darryl McGore, a prisoner incarcerated at Oaks Correctional Facility, filed a *pro se* complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.¹ Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. Because Plaintiff McGore has filed at least three lawsuits that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious or for failure to state a claim, he is barred from proceeding *in forma pauperis* under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Court will order Plaintiff to pay the \$350.00 civil action filing fee within twenty-eight (28) days of this opinion and accompanying order, and if Plaintiff fails to do so, the Court will order that his action be dismissed without prejudice. Even if the case is dismissed, Plaintiff will be

¹Plaintiff McGore signed the complaint and listed himself and another prisoner, Antoine Maybin, as plaintiffs. Ordinarily, when there are multiple plaintiffs, each plaintiff is proportionately liable for any fees or costs. *See Talley-Bey v. Knebl*, 168 F.3d 884, 887 (6th Cir. 1999); *In re Prison Litigation Reform Act*, 105 F.3d 1131, 1137 (6th Cir. 1997). In the instant case, however, prisoner Maybin did not sign the complaint. Therefore, the Clerk of the Court did not list Maybin as a plaintiff. Plaintiff McGore lacks standing to assert the constitutional rights of other prisoners. *Newsom v. Norris*, 888 F.2d 371, 381 (6th Cir. 1989); *Raines v. Goedde*, No. 92-3120, 1992 WL 188120, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 6, 1992). As a layman, Plaintiff McGore may only represent himself with respect to his individual claims, and may not act on behalf of other prisoners. *See O'Malley v. Brierley*, 477 F.2d 785 (3d Cir. 1973); *Lutz v. LaVelle*, 809 F.Supp. 323, 325 (M.D. Pa. 1991); *Snead v. Kirkland*, 462 F.Supp. 914, 918 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Because Antoine Maybin did not sign the complaint and Plaintiff McGore cannot assert the rights of other prisoners, Plaintiff McGore is not entitled to an apportionment of the civil action filing fee with Antoine Maybin.

responsible for payment of the \$350.00 filing fee in accordance with *In re Alea*, 286 F.3d 378, 380-81 (6th Cir. 2002).

Discussion

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), which was enacted on April 26, 1996, amended the procedural rules governing a prisoner's request for the privilege of proceeding *in forma pauperis*. As the Sixth Circuit has stated, the PLRA was "aimed at the skyrocketing numbers of claims filed by prisoners – many of which are meritless – and the corresponding burden those filings have placed on the federal courts." *Hampton v. Hobbs*, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997). For that reason, Congress put into place economic incentives to prompt a prisoner to "stop and think" before filing a complaint. *Id.* For example, a prisoner is liable for the civil action filing fee, and if the prisoner qualifies to proceed *in forma pauperis*, the prisoner may pay the fee through partial payments as outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). The constitutionality of the fee requirements of the PLRA has been upheld by the Sixth Circuit. *Id.* at 1288.

In addition, another provision reinforces the "stop and think" aspect of the PLRA by preventing a prisoner from proceeding *in forma pauperis* when the prisoner repeatedly files meritless lawsuits. Known as the "three-strikes" rule, the provision states:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under [the section governing proceedings *in forma pauperis*] if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The statutory restriction “[i]n no event,” found in § 1915(g), is express and unequivocal. The statute does allow an exception for a prisoner who is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” The Sixth Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of the “three-strikes” rule against arguments that it violates equal protection, the right of access to the courts, and due process, and that it constitutes a bill of attainder and is *ex post facto* legislation. *Wilson v. Yaklich*, 148 F.3d 596, 604-06 (6th Cir. 1998); *accord Rodriguez v. Cook*, 169 F.3d 1176, 1178-82 (9th Cir. 1999); *Rivera v. Allin*, 144 F.3d 719, 723-26 (11th Cir. 1998); *Carson v. Johnson*, 112 F.3d 818, 821-22 (5th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff has been an active litigant in this Court, having filed more than twenty-five civil actions. In more than three of Plaintiff’s lawsuits, the Court entered dismissals on the grounds that the cases were frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim. *See McGore v. Mich. Supreme Court Judges*, No. 1:94-cv-517 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 25, 1995); *McGore v. Nardi*, No. 2:93-cv-137 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 2, 1993); *McGore v. Stine*, No. 2:93-cv-112 (W.D. Mich. July 26, 1993); *McGore v. Stine*, No. 2:93-cv-77 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 30, 1993). Although all of the dismissals were entered before enactment of the PLRA on April 26, 1996, the dismissals nevertheless count as strikes. *See Wilson*, 148 F.3d at 604. In addition, Plaintiff previously has been denied leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* on multiple occasions for having three strikes. *See McGore v. Curtin et al.*, No. 1:10-cv-257 (W.D. Mich. May 19, 2010); *McGore v. Mich. Parole Bd. et al.*, No. 1:09-cv-922 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 23, 2009); *McGore v. Curtin et al.*, No. 1:09-cv-820 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 21, 2009); *McGore v. Rich*, 1:09-cv-395 (W.D. Mich. May 12, 2009); *McGore v. McKee et al.*, 1:04-cv-421 (W.D. Mich. June 29, 2004); *McGore v. Gundy*, No. 1:00-cv-490 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 7, 2000); *McGore v. Gundy*, No. 1:00-cv-486 (W.D. Mich. July 19, 2000); *McGore v. Gundy*, No. 1:00-cv-155 (W.D. Mich. Mar.

15, 2000); *McGore v. Gundy*, No. 1:98-cv-367 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 1998); *McGore v. Mich. Dep't of Corr.*, No. 1:97-cv-202 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 4, 1997).

Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to proceed *in forma pauperis* in this action because the three-strikes rule violates the *Ex Post Facto* Clause. (Compl., Page ID ##12-13, docket #1.) As stated above, the Sixth Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of the “three-strikes” rule against arguments that it is *ex post facto* legislation. *Wilson*, 148 F.3d at 604-06. Therefore, Plaintiff’s *ex post facto* argument fails.

Plaintiff further argues that he satisfies the imminent danger exception under Section 1915(g). Plaintiff claims that he experienced imminent danger when Defendants refused to allow him to participate in rehabilitative programs from August 11, 2009 until May 10, 2010. (Compl., Page ID ##3-5, docket #1.) Plaintiff also argues that he was subject to imminent danger when officers spread their saliva on open food trays while talking. (*Id.* at 8.) To satisfy the imminent danger exception under Section 1915(g), Plaintiff must allege an imminent danger of “serious physical injury.” Although Congress did not define “serious physical injury,” various courts have interpreted the meaning of the phrase. *See Ibrahim v. Dist. of Columbia*, 464 F.3d 3, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“chronic disease that could result in serious harm or even death” constitutes “serious physical injury”); *Brown v. Johnson*, 387 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004) (HIV and Hepatitis C were a “serious physical injury”); *Ciarpaglini v. Saini*, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003) (“heart palpitations, chest pains, labored breathing, choking sensations, and paralysis in . . . legs and back” resulting from a denial of medication were a serious physical injury); *McAlphin v. Toney*, 281 F.3d 709, 710 (8th Cir. 2002) (a spreading infection in the mouth that resulted from a lack of proper dental treatment amounted to a serious physical injury). Plaintiff has not alleged any serious physical

injury in his complaint with respect to the denial of rehabilitative programs or the spreading of saliva on an open food tray.

Even if Plaintiff had alleged a serious physical injury, he still fails to satisfy the “imminent” requirement. Congress did not define “imminent danger” in the PLRA, but it is significant that Congress chose to use the word “imminent,” a word that conveys the idea of immediacy. “Imminent” is “[n]ear at hand . . . impending; on the point of happening; threatening, menacing, perilous. Something which is threatening to happen at once, something close at hand, something to happen upon the instant . . . and on the point of happening.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 514-15 (6th ed. 1991). “Imminent” is also defined as “ready to take place, near at hand, impending, hanging threateningly over one’s head, menacingly near.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1130 (1976). “Imminent danger” is “such an appearance of threatened and impending injury as would put a reasonable and prudent man to his instant defense.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 515 (6th ed. 1991).

In a recent decision, the Sixth Circuit recognized the standard adopted by other circuit courts:

While the Sixth Circuit has not defined the term “imminent danger” for purposes of this section, other Circuits have held that to meet the requirement, the threat or prison condition “must be real and proximate” and the danger of serious physical injury must exist at the time the complaint is filed. *See, e.g., Ciarpaglini v. Saini*, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003); *Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie*, 239 F.3d 307, 313 (3d Cir.2001) (en banc). Thus a prisoner’s assertion that he or she faced danger in the past is insufficient to invoke the exception. *Id.* Other Circuits also have held that district courts may deny a prisoner leave to proceed pursuant to § 1915(g) when the prisoner’s claims of imminent danger are “conclusory or ridiculous,” *Ciarpaglini*, 352 F.3d at 331, or are “‘clearly baseless’ (i.e. are fantastic or delusional and rise to the level of ‘irrational or wholly

incredible).” *Gibbs v. Cross*, 160 F.3d 962, 967 (3d Cir.1998)
(quoting *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).

Rittner v. Kinder, 290 F. App’x 796, 797-98 (6th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff’s assertion that he experienced imminent danger in the past in regards to the rehabilitative programs and the food trays does not suggest that the danger is real or proximate. Because Plaintiff fails to allege either a serious physical injury or that a serious physical injury is imminent, he fails to satisfy the imminent danger of serious physical injury exception under Section 1915(g).

In light of the foregoing, § 1915(g) prohibits Plaintiff from proceeding *in forma pauperis* in this action. Plaintiff has twenty-eight (28) days from the date of entry of this order to pay the entire civil action filing fee, which is \$350.00. When Plaintiff pays his filing fee, the Court will screen his complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). If Plaintiff fails to pay the filing fee within the 28-day period, his case will be dismissed without prejudice, but he will continue to be responsible for payment of the \$350.00 filing fee.

Dated: August 6, 2010

/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SEND REMITTANCES TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS:

Clerk, U.S. District Court
399 Federal Building
110 Michigan Street, NW
Grand Rapids, MI 49503

All checks or other forms of payment shall be payable to “Clerk, U.S. District Court.”